I. INTRODUCTION
In his wonderful new book, The Promise of Human Rights, 1 Professor Jamie Mayerfeld advances a bold thesis. He contends that "international human rights law is a necessary extension of domestic checks and balances, and therefore necessary for constitutional government itself." Moreover, he adds, "constitutional democracy is incomplete unless domestic human rights institutions are bolted into a system of international guarantees." 2 In defending these claims, Mayerfeld is challenging two different beliefs held by many US legal scholars. Call these the "majoritarian view" and the "sovereigntist view." Majoritarians, like Justice Scalia, tend to see rights-based judicial review as a threat to democratic governance because judges engaged in rights-based judicial review substitute their own views for the will of the majority. 3 Mayerfeld's response to the majoritarian objection is rooted in a conception of "Madisonian democracy" that he defends at length in Chapter 2. In brief, Mayerfeld contends that James Madison endorsed "a nonvoluntarist conception of democracy."
4 According to the nonvoluntarist conception, " [t] he point of popular government is not to realize the people's will . . . but instead to foster just and wise policy . . . Justice and the common good, not self-interest or group interest, should determine the political choices of citizens and officials alike." 5 Mayerfeld believes that implementation of international human rights norms promotes justice and the common good. Therefore, based on his theory of Madisonian democracy, Mayerfeld argues that judicial application of international human rights law "is not antidemocratic [because] . . . [t] he policies it bars are policies that governments should not consider anyway, so their removal from legislative consideration represents no loss for democracy." 6 In contrast to majoritarians, sovereigntists accept the need for rights-based judicial review to check the excesses of Vol. 39 972 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY majoritarian democracy. However, they challenge the democratic legitimacy of international human rights law, and of supranational judicial review, because they believe that democracy requires self-governance, and self-governance means that decisions about protection of individual rights must be made at the national level. 7 Responding to the sovereigntists, Mayerfeld quotes the Declaration of Independence to support his view that "all human beings are 'endowed with certain unalienable rights'" and that "governments exist 'to secure these rights. '" 8 In the eighteenth century, Madison recognized that majoritarian democracy in state governments posed a threat to the unalienable rights of minorities. Madison addressed this problem by designing a constitutional system that transferred authority from state governments to the national government to provide an external check on majoritarian tyranny at the state level. 9 Mayerfeld argues that, in the twenty-first century, protection of unalienable rights necessitates a transfer of authority from the national to the supranational level to provide an external check on majoritarian tyranny in nation-states. In his words: "The conditions that in Madison's time threatened justice in direct democracies and small republics are today reproduced and exacerbated at the national level . . . In our own time, Madisonian constitutionalism calls for international oversight of national policy-in other words, the creation of a strong international human rights regime." 10 In sum, the rights codified in international human rights treaties are the "inalienable rights of all members of the human family." 11 The central purpose of democratic government is to protect those inalienable rights. If legislators do their jobs well, they will enact laws to promote effective implementation of human rights norms. However, judicial review is necessary to ensure that legislators do not sacrifice inalienable human rights on the altar of majoritarian preferences. Moreover, effective protection of human rights requires an external check on national decision-makers. Mayerfeld devotes two chapters of his book to a detailed analysis of the war on terror to show that-even in the United States, a nation founded on a commitment to inalienable rights-the national government has an unfortunate tendency to violate fundamental human rights when perceived national security interests are at stake. 12 Since the United States government has demonstrated its willingness to sacrifice human rights in the name of national security, and since domestic judicial review, by itself, is not sufficient to protect those rights, international oversight is needed to provide additional protection.
I am sympathetic to the broad contours of Professor Mayerfeld's argument. Nevertheless, this review essay will challenge portions of his account. rights protections in the United States. Here, though, I think his account omits some important information and gives insufficient weight to current political realities. First, the United States is already subject to various forms of "weak" international oversight. Mayerfeld's account understates the value of those weak oversight mechanisms. Instead, he urges adoption of "strong" international oversight mechanisms. For better or worse, though, the constitutional requirement to secure a two-thirds Senate majority to adopt any of the strong mechanisms that he favors makes it politically impossible for the United States to subject itself to strong international oversight in the foreseeable future. Therefore, those who favor international oversight should consider options for bolstering the weak mechanisms that already apply to the United States.
Part Two focuses on what Mayerfeld calls the United States' "self-exemption policy." 13 In brief, this is the US policy of refusing to ratify most human rights treaties and of ratifying other treaties subject to "reservations, understandings, and declarations" (RUDs) that limit the domestic effect of ratified treaties in the United States. I agree with much of his critique of the self-exemption policy.
14 Even so, Part Two contends that there is a significant tension between the self-exemption policy and Mayerfeld's defense of the democratic legitimacy of international human rights law. Specifically, Part Two shows that-despite the self-exemption policy-the United States has actually incorporated many important international human rights norms into US domestic law by means of "silent incorporation" and "indirect application." 15 However, the self-exemption policy severely restricts "direct application" of international human rights treaties. By restricting direct application, and channeling the domestic application of international human rights norms into silent incorporation and indirect application, the self-exemption policy exacerbates the tension between majoritarian democratic principles and the domestic enforcement of international human rights norms. In conclusion, I suggest that Congress could partially reverse the self-exemption policy by authorizing direct judicial application of human rights treaties in US courts. Compared to silent incorporation and indirect application, direct application of human rights treaties would be more consistent with majoritarian democratic principles.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT
In 
53 The key phrase here is "judicial oversight." In contrast to the various weak forms of oversight that apply to the United States, the European Court of Human Rights has the power to issue legally binding judgments. In theory, the United States could subject itself to a similar regime of supranational judicial review by ratifying the American Convention on Human Rights and accepting the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 54 However, ratification of the American Convention would require a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate. From a political standpoint, securing a two-thirds majority to accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court is even less realistic than obtaining the requisite Senate majority to accept international inspections under the Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention. Moreover, although supranational judicial review by the Inter-American Court could potentially offer significant human rights benefits, it also presents real risks. When the United States government is forced to defend itself in litigation, it tends to adopt the least restrictive possible interpretation of its human rights obligations. In contrast, the US government has been willing to accept more restrictive interpretations of those obligations when it interacts with the various weak international oversight mechanisms summarized above. 55 Therefore, in the long run, weak international oversight may produce better human rights outcomes than supranational judicial review. 
III. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SELF-EXEMPTION POLICY
Chapters 4 and 5 of The Promise of Human Rights present a detailed analysis of the United States' "self-exemption policy." Mayerfeld argues, quite correctly, that the United States made a deliberate policy decision "to loosen the constraints of international human rights law on its own laws and policies." 56 He sometimes uses the term "American exceptionalism" to characterize this policy decision, but I will refer to it as the "self-exemption policy" (a term that Mayerfeld also uses). He describes several different mechanisms that the United States has utilized to implement its self-exemption policy. 57 For present purposes, the key mechanisms are the refusal to ratify most human rights treaties and the decision to adopt a set of RUDs that constrain the domestic effects of the human rights treaties we have ratified. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze the relationship between the self-exemption policy and the Bush administration's legal justification for using torture as an instrument of policy in the war on terror.
58 Specifically, he contends, "U.S. marginalization of international human rights law is far from being the sole cause of the torture policy, but it is a significant contributing factor." 59 In this respect, Mayerfeld's analysis is wholly persuasive.
Chapter 6 of The Promise of Human Rights defends the democratic legitimacy of international human rights law. 60 Here, Mayerfeld distinguishes between "constitutional democracy" and "political constitutionalism." He describes constitutional democracy as a system "in which popular government is limited by human rights" and " [t] 
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Mayerfeld defends constitutional democracy on the grounds that robust judicial review is necessary to protect human rights. In my view, though, his account gives insufficient weight to the value of popular sovereignty. Part III explains how a partial reversal of the self-exemption policy could help create a system that combines the virtues of popular sovereignty with robust judicial protection of human rights.
A. The Current US System of Constitutional Democracy
The key feature that distinguishes the US legal system from Mayerfeld's vision of constitutional democracy is that US courts routinely exercise judicial oversight of human rights obligations enshrined in constitutional law, but they rarely exercise judicial review based on international human rights norms that are not codified in federal constitutional or statutory law. 64 Here, it bears emphasis that many, many international human rights norms are enshrined in US constitutional law. Consider three examples. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest." 65 Similarly, However, between 1948 and 1971 the Court dramatically expanded the class of rights that qualify as "fundamental." In the process, the Court expressly overruled several older decisions by holding that rights previously classified as "not fundamental" would thereafter be considered fundamental rights that bind the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. expanded its concept of fundamental rights to encompass rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration, while excluding rights that are not so enumerated. 80 In the process, the Court incorporated virtually all of the civil and political rights codified in the Universal Declaration into a body of constitutional law that binds federal, state, and local governments. I refer to the Court's approach as "silent incorporation" because the Court incorporated international human rights norms into federal constitutional law without explicitly citing international human rights instruments. The incorporation cases are not the only cases in which the Court has utilized silent incorporation to incorporate international human rights norms into federal constitutional law. In Brown v.
Board of Education
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-one of the most important Supreme Court decisions of the twentieth century-the Court re-interpreted the Equal Protection Clause and overruled entrenched Supreme Court precedent to align its equal protection jurisprudence with the international norm prohibiting racial discrimination. Brown differs from the incorporation cases in that the plaintiffs in Brown-and in its companion case Bolling v. Sharpe 82 -relied heavily on the human rights provisions of the UN Charter to support their argument for invalidating racial segregation in public schools. 83 Despite the plaintiffs' emphasis on the UN Charter, though, the Court's opinion did not explicitly cite the Charter. Instead, the Court chose to rely on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to support its ruling that racial segregation in public schools is unlawful.
In the past two decades, the Supreme Court has sometimes applied the technique of "indirect application," rather than silent incorporation, to incorporate international human rights norms into federal constitutional and statutory law. One could cite numerous other cases where US courts have applied international human rights norms by means of silent incorporation or indirect application. However, the examples discussed in the preceding paragraphs illustrate the central point. The United States currently has a system of "constitutional democracy," which Mayerfeld describes as a system "in which popular government is limited by human rights" and "[t]he constitutionalization of human rights . . .
[is] backed by judicial review." 87 The key difference between the current US system and Mayerfeld's ideal is that US courts do not apply international human rights treaties directly as rules of decision. Instead, they apply international human rights norms through silent incorporation and indirect application. Even without direct application of treaties, though, the courts protect human rights and constrain majoritarian democracy by engaging in judicial review.
B. Self-Exemption, Direct Application, and Democratic Legitimacy
Direct application occurs when a court applies a treaty directly as a rule of decision, instead of applying international law indirectly as a guide to constitutional or statutory interpretation. 89 During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, US courts often applied treaties directly to resolve disputes about protection of individual rights. 90 The modern trend of applying international human rights norms through silent incorporation and indirect application-instead of direct application-is a consequence of the self-exemption policy. The self-exemption policy has its origins in debates about the Bricker Amendment in the early 1950s. 91 The proposed Bricker Amendment was a response to judicial decisions in which courts applied the UN Charter's human rights provisions directly to invalidate discriminatory state laws-in particular, the California Court of Appeals' decision in Fujii v. California. 92 The Fujii decision was emotionally jarring for many Americans because the court held that a California law that discriminated against Japanese nationals did violate the UN Charter's human rights provisions but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Most Americans, then and now, were not psychologically prepared to accept the idea that international law provides more robust protection for fundamental human rights than does our own Constitution. As one influential commentator noted at the time: "It would seem, indeed, a reproach to our constitutional system to confess that the values it establishes fall below any requirement of the Charter. One should think very seriously before admitting such a deficiency." 93 Since the 1950s, American pride in the (presumed) superiority of the US Constitution has prevented most Americans from acknowledging that human rights protections under the Constitution sometimes fall short of international standards. A central goal of the Bricker Amendment was to ensure that no US court would ever again challenge the American faith in the normative superiority of our Constitution by holding that a state law that is lawful under the Fourteenth Amendment violates US treaty obligations under an international human rights treaty. Although the Bricker Amendment never passed, the United States adopted two related strategies to accomplish that goal. First, we have consistently adhered to the self-exemption policy. Under that policy, the United States has refused to ratify most human rights treaties and it has adopted RUDs that severely restrict direct application of the treaties it does ratify. Second, through a combination of silent incorporation and indirect application, the Supreme Court has substantially expanded the human rights protections available under the Fourteenth Amendment and related constitutional provisions to help align federal constitutional law with international human rights norms. 94 Ironically, the combination of the selfexemption policy (which restricts direct application of human rights treaties) with silent incorporation and indirect application has exacerbated the tension between popular sovereignty and judicial enforcement of human rights norms in the United States. 95 To clarify this point, it is helpful to draw upon Professor Jack Balkin's analysis of democratic legitimacy. Balkin identifies three distinct kinds of legitimacy: moral legitimacy, procedural legitimacy and sociological legitimacy. 96 A legal system "is morally legitimate to the extent that the system is just or morally admirable." 97 A legal system is procedurally legitimate "to the extent that people clothed with state power . . . make decisions according to official legal rules and procedures." It is "sociologically legitimate to the extent that people accept the system as having the right and the authority to rule them." 98 Mayerfeld's defense of the democratic legitimacy of international human rights law focuses primarily on moral legitimacy. 99 He gives short shrift to considerations of procedural and sociological legitimacy. Consequently, in my view, Mayerfeld gives insufficient weight to the value of popular sovereignty.
Our current system-in which courts engage in "stealth" application of human rights norms through silent incorporation and indirect application-lacks procedural legitimacy because unelected judges effectively exercise legislative power whenever they re-interpret constitutional provisions to align federal constitutional jurisprudence with international human rights norms. In contrast, Congress could guarantee the procedural legitimacy of judicial decisions applying international human rights law by enacting federal legislation to authorize direct judicial application of human rights treaties. I have proposed this type of legislation previously.
100 Such legislation would partially reverse the self-exemption policy because it would ensure that the nonself-executing declarations attached to human rights treaties do not bar direct judicial application of those treaties. Moreover, this type of legislation would alleviate the tension between popular sovereignty and the judicial enforcement of international human rights norms by granting procedural legitimacy to such judicial enforcement.
Any proposal for federal legislation along these lines invites at least two potential objections. First, one might argue that such legislation would lack sociological legitimacy because the American people do not accept the legitimacy of international human rights law. Given current popular attitudes about international human rights, this objection has merit. However, American attitudes about international human rights law are changing, as evidenced by the degree to which the United States government has been willing to cooperate with the various weak international oversight mechanisms discussed in Part One of this essay. 101 Moreover, federal legislation to authorize direct application of human rights treaties would require a majority vote in both houses of Congress. Inasmuch as senators and congressmen are elected to represent their constituents, a majority vote in both houses of Congress would itself be compelling evidence that international human rights law has finally achieved sociological legitimacy in the United States.
Others may object that it is politically unrealistic to think that Congress would enact legislation to authorize direct judicial application of human rights treaties. I have two responses to this objection. First, it is easier to secure a simple majority in both Houses of Congress than it is to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Hence, human rights advocates are more likely to make progress on human rights through bicameral legislation than through treaty ratification. Second, if human rights advocates cannot shift the terms of political debate to the point where it becomes politically feasible for Congress to enact the type of legislation I am suggesting, then judicial application of international human rights law in US courts will continue to lack procedural and sociological legitimacy. In Antigay Bias in Role Model Occupations, Professor E. Gary Spitko discusses how employers regularly exclude people from role model occupations based on their sexual orientation and why such exclusion matters. The book's central theme is "that employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation with particular respect to role-model occupations has served as a means to exclude gay people from the public social spaces that identify and teach whom our society respects and whom members of society should seek to emulate." 1 This book comes at an important time and makes a real contribution to the existing literature on anti-discrimination law.
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In the United States, Title VII is the federal law that prohibits discrimination because of sex. There is currently a circuit split about whether Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on a person's sexual orientation. In Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana, 2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimination. However, several other circuit courts have held that Title VII does not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. 3 While there is a rich literature about why federal law should prohibit employment discrimination, Professor Spitko provides another compelling reason. His book demonstrates how employers have long excluded gay people from being lawyers, from serving in the military, from being teachers, and from playing professional sports once their sexual orientation became known. Professor Spitko convincingly argues that excluding people from these role model occupations has a host of consequences, including making it difficult for gay people to see themselves in role model occupations
